Policy brief
Maize shortage a threat to food security in Kenya
Maize is the primary staple food crop in Kenya. It is the most frequently produced and marketed crop, grown by 90 percent of households and sold by more than 30 percent of the households in areas where the crop is grown. Maize dominates all food security considerations. Maize production has, however, been on the decline, reducing from 2.7 million tones in 1995 to 2.1 million tonnes in 2007. Similarly, maize yields have declined over 30 percent over the same period.
The decline in yields is largely attributed to reduced use of certified seed maize, climate change and low and inefficient usage of fertilizers. This means that the future growth in maize production would have to depend mainly on yield gains made possible by widespread use of productivity – enhancing technologies such as use of certified seed maize, fertilizers and agrochemicals. In deed, seed is known to hold a huge potential of increasing on-farm productivity and enhancing food security. It largely influences the upper limit of productivity of all other agricultural inputs applied into the farming system. This not withstanding, Kenya has been experiencing declining use of certified seed maize mainly due to non-availability of high quality seed of sustainable varieties at affordable prices. Majority of maize farmers (about 83 percent) perceive certified seed maize as being generally very expensive.
Maize production was disrupted in key producing areas of the Rift Valley in particular, as farmers were unable to harvest their crops from the 2007 long rains season in a timely fashion after the outbreak of the post election conflict. Heightened pre-and post harvest losses occurred as the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB), the main buyer of newly harvested grain, did not purchase maize after the onset of the crisis. The production losses and limited purchasing activity had a significant impact on household food security. Households in the grain basket received low producer prices therefore earning decreased incomes. Households in deficit production areas and urban areas faced reduced food access due to 10 to 20 percent increase in prices.
The price of maize in Kenya is among the highest in Eastern and Southern Africa, the lowest income quartile of the Kenyan population spends 28 percent of its income on maize. The inefficient maize production-marketing system has contributed to economic stagnation and worsening levels of poverty. Increased productivity, more efficient markets, and rational government policies could dramatically alter the economic contribution of the maize sub-sector – from being a drag on the economy to becoming a key element in accelerated growth and poverty reduction.
Following the post election violence that hit the Rift Valley in early 2008, displaced farmers saw access to their land dramatically reduced; high input prices (in particular fertilizer and fuel) forced low income farmers to reduce the surface under cultivation and the use of inputs; erratic rainfall reduced maize yields in Eastern and Northern Kenya. All the above contributed to a marked decline of maize production during the 2008/09 farming season. Current estimates, taking in full considerations the results of the “short rains” planting season are now pointing towards an overall output of 2.1 million tons instead of the 2.6 million tons initially anticipated. Considering current levels of consumption and draw down from stocks (largely in the hands of private traders), an overall deficit of some 190,000 Mt is expected and current stocks should last until May, well before the onset of the new harvest in the middle of July 2009.
At the same time, the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) cannot play its institutional role injecting grains in the market as stock was drawn down during the summer in anticipation of a good rain harvest. However, the season was mediocre and the remaining SGR stock was released on to the market in October-November 2008 in a bid to moderate the sharp rising prices. Due to the limited quantities injected and mismanagement/corruption of the operation, no positive effects were observed.
The shortfall of maize combined with very high prices prevailing in the international markets in the first half of the year have pushed the internal price of maize to a very high level, thereby reducing access to food by the most vulnerable section of the population. At the end of 2008, the retail price of maize flour was Ksh 60/Kg or some 50 percent higher than in the same period last year. Wholesale maize prices equally went up some 50 percent from Ksh 1,350 to Ksh. 2,100 – 2,300.
At the end of November, the government took the following measures in order to reduce the market price: reducing maize flour from Ksh.60/kg for middle income citizens and Ksh. 26 for the most vulnerable; the National Cereals and Produce Board was ordered to release at least 27,000 Mt of maize grains to millers for processing with immediate effect. The government increased the Cereals Board of Kenya (CBK) buying price to Ksh 2,300 per bag from Ksh. 1,950 in order to encourage farmers to sell their maize. These measures have not had any significant impact on the retail price of maize flour, which continues to remain very high.
The situation was further complicated by reported poor handling of the Strategic Grain Reserve, of market interventions and decisions on imports. Several sources suggest that big producers and traders are holding on to their stocks in order to create an artificial shortage of maize on the market and keep prices at a high level at the same time they are exporting maize to neighbouring countries.
In January 2009, the president Hon Mwai Kibaki declared the food shortage a national disaster. As a short term measure, the government approved the importation of 900,000 MT (10 million 90Kg bags) duty free maize grains into the country in order to boost supply. This was to be done by both the government and the private sector. The government was to import seven million bags (630,000 Mt) for its Strategic Grain Reserves, while the millers and traders were to import three million bags (270,000 Mt). In addition and in order to keep the local domestic production within the country, exports of maize grain and flour was banned. It is not expected that new imports of maize will reach the country before February/March 2009.
For the time being, the government has indicated that 10 million persons are highly food insecure. This number includes a provisional estimate: (i) of 3.2 million drought affected marginal farmers, agro pastoralists in the arid and semi arid districts of northern and eastern Kenya; (ii) about 150,000 Internally Displaced (IPDs); (iii) 850,000 school children that will be incorporated into an emergency school feeding programme; (iv) 3.5 million urban slum dwellers, and (v) about 2.2 million persons affected by HIV/AIDS, including HIV orphans.
Policy Recommendations
From the foregoing discussions, it seems clear that any reductions by lowering overhead costs, company’s mark-ups or shortening the market chain. Maize prices can also be reduced by addressing non-price constraints influencing pricing of maize. It is, therefore recommended that:
A) Maize millers be restructured to lower overhead costs, shorten distribution chains and lower profit margins.
Reducing dependence on expensive bank overdrafts could substantially reduce overhead costs by about 30 percent while the maize distribution chain can be shortened by elimination of sub-agents level. Millers should also lower their profit mark-up margins from current level to about 15 percent. It is estimated that implementation of these measures could help reduce maize prices by about 15 percent.
B) Review laws and regulations governing the seed sub-sector.
Specifically, the seeds and Plant Varieties Act, Cap 326, should be reviewed and harmonized to accommodate accreditation of private seed inspectors and facilitate self regulation. This should complement the process of seed inspection and certification by KEPHIS. The government should also hasten rationalisation and harmonization of seed regulation within the region to ensure free flow of maize, without compromising quality. This could provide an alternative source of cheap seed, especially if both local and imported continues being expensive.
C) Seed varieties developed by research institutions such as KARI should be made available to all interested parties through simple and transparent bidding systems.
Successful bidders should preferably be granted non-exclusive rights over the varieties but must ensure that the varieties maintain their distinct attributes and quality. The law should also be reviewed to entrench payment of royalties for publicly-funded breeding programmes.
D) Unnecessary bureaucratic procedures in variety release should be removed.
Presently, it takes too long to have the varieties officially released even after the National Variety Release Committee has given its recommendations for official/ formal release. The National Variety Release Committee should be empowered to be officially releasing new varieties.
E) Irrigated seed production should be promoted.
Seed companies and maize research institutions should promote irrigated seed maize production, both in the research sites and seed growing areas, to allow for both distance and time isolation, and for production of seed in less populated and isolated regions.
F) The government should pursue policies that improve the competitiveness of the agricultural sector relative to other sectors through, for example, increasing appropriate productivity-enhancing investment in agriculture such as rural infrastructure and agricultural extension.
G) Accountability and transparency
We also question the ways of channelling public aid to those who are most in need. We fear that the lack of transparency and accountability which has tainted the Kenyan administration for decades is reflected in this matter as well. The intention of a government when it declares a “national disaster” can be a noble one. The ensuing influx of funds, however, also creates new temptations for those who know to turn the system to their personal advantage. We see relief food marked ‘not for sale’ ending up in the shops a practice trend that has to stop.
let your inputs flow,especially on the policy recommendation
Friday, February 27, 2009
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
POLICY BRIEF
FAMINE & CHRONIC HUNGER IN KENYA
“Famine is, by its very nature, a social phenomenon… [I]t has to be recognised that even when the prime mover in famine is a natural occurrence such as a flood or a drought, what its impact will be on the population will depend on how society is organised.”
(Drèze, J. & Sen, A., 1989)
Natural disasters occur frequently worldwide; only on rare occasions are they associated with famine. Famines are extreme events that generate spontaneous goodwill from churches and charitable organisations. Chronic hunger does not necessarily lead to famine but kills a proportionately larger number of people. However recurrent, we cannot deal with a mighty blaze alone if we forget the slow, smouldering combustion that is eating people day by day.
Though the country is making progress in dealing with malnutrition, one Kenyan out of three is undernourished and the under-five mortality rate is still growing. Chronic hunger is related to poverty and a persistent failure to allow sufficient groups of people to have access and control or ‘entitlements’ over food. Rather than importing food stuffs from other countries, we strongly advocate for egalitarian social and economic development. This is likely to be required for sustained, extensive reductions in chronic hunger.
In tackling the recent famine and prevailing chronic hunger we look upon the State and its institutions in terms of immediate response, coordination, redress and prevention. The economic successes in the tea, horticulture and dairy sector in Kenya have all been attributed to public support and favourable regulations. A 2005 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) report on food-security in Africa mentioned in particular the positive effects of: “…
- the role of the legal and policy framework (land reform, regulatory frameworks, contractual arrangements);
- institutional support through initially public-funded authorities that provide services to producers, and sometimes are used for channelling subsidies (inputs), but which are gradually transferred to producer associations or the private sector; and
- Public infrastructure (for transport of product and export abroad).”
Concentrating on food availability in a country like Kenya does neither identify the real causes of chronic hunger nor of famine. Increasing Kenya’s agricultural productivity alone will, therefore, not solve the problem. Instead, an examination of the social relationships that identifies different groups of people with command and ‘entitlements’ over food is more effective and points at the heart of the matter. It has been said that the top 10 percent households control over 42 percent of the country’s total income, while the bottom 10 percent control less than 1 percent. For every shilling a poor Kenyan earns, a rich Kenyan earns 56 shillings.
Land is often regarded as an important resource in Kenya and can be the origin of inequality and violent disputes. The type of land being held and the way it is being held is important. With over 80% of the population dependent on agriculture, access to arable land is a clear dimension of inequality. While a few landowners own huge tracks of idle land, landless farmers are squatting in fragile forests. Whereas the arid and semi-arid areas remain inappropriately administered, policed or abandoned entirely in spite of their potential viability, public land, eyed as profitable, was allocated illegally or irregularly to the well-connected and often developed subsequently with public funds as well. As a matter of priority, we urge a sustained and firm commitment to develop the marginalized areas of Kenya, in terms of access to water, security and public infrastructure.
A key element in the prevention of famine is the protection and creation of livelihoods, which can in principle be achieved through public action. Public action could reduce chronic hunger through providing jobs, health care, education, access to water and elements of social security. This, obviously, raises questions about a government’s development policies in general, and its actual political will to implement those. We would like to see massive support for the small farmer through improved land tenure security, extension services, irrigation schemes, and access to credit.
Kenya was to develop its Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS) since 2002, this has been a challenge to date. We welcome the spirit of openness on the part of the Government, indispensable in creating a collaborative environment in which decisions are to be taken. We see, however, two significant weaknesses in this system: (1) underdeveloped co-ordinating structures at national level, in particular limited government involvement in the existing structures and poor linkages between information and response planning/policy options; and (2) poor linkages within and between levels e.g. from community to district to provincial and national levels. We see the lack of coordination and integration within and between the various structures and institutions as probably the most important constraint in the fight against famine and chronic hunger. We are particularly weary of new and ad hoc departments within government which have been created over the years when ever there is famine and only complicate the prevailing disorientation.
We also question the ways of channelling public aid to those who are most in need. We fear that the lack of accountability and transparency, which has tainted the Kenyan administration for decades, is reflected in this matter as well. The intention of a government when it declares a “national disaster” can be a noble one. The ensuing influx of funds, however, also creates new temptations for those who know to turn the system to their personal advantage. The situation is further complicated by reported poor handling of the Strategic Grain Reserve, of market interventions and decision on imports. Several sources suggest that big producers and traders are holding on to their stocks in order to create an artificial shortage of maize on the market and keep prices at a high level at the same time they are exporting maize to neighbouring countries. We see relief food marked ‘not for sale’ ending up in the shops. To misallocate funds destined for the poor, even through neglect, is a grave sin in the Bible (Luke 16, 19-31).
Public action to prevent famine is most likely to be taken when vulnerable people have been empowered by political movements which establish a governmental obligation to prevent mass starvation. In this regard, we disapprove the tendency, to remove all affirmative action in favour of minorities and marginalized groups.
Your reactions and comments are welcomed
FAMINE & CHRONIC HUNGER IN KENYA
“Famine is, by its very nature, a social phenomenon… [I]t has to be recognised that even when the prime mover in famine is a natural occurrence such as a flood or a drought, what its impact will be on the population will depend on how society is organised.”
(Drèze, J. & Sen, A., 1989)
Natural disasters occur frequently worldwide; only on rare occasions are they associated with famine. Famines are extreme events that generate spontaneous goodwill from churches and charitable organisations. Chronic hunger does not necessarily lead to famine but kills a proportionately larger number of people. However recurrent, we cannot deal with a mighty blaze alone if we forget the slow, smouldering combustion that is eating people day by day.
Though the country is making progress in dealing with malnutrition, one Kenyan out of three is undernourished and the under-five mortality rate is still growing. Chronic hunger is related to poverty and a persistent failure to allow sufficient groups of people to have access and control or ‘entitlements’ over food. Rather than importing food stuffs from other countries, we strongly advocate for egalitarian social and economic development. This is likely to be required for sustained, extensive reductions in chronic hunger.
In tackling the recent famine and prevailing chronic hunger we look upon the State and its institutions in terms of immediate response, coordination, redress and prevention. The economic successes in the tea, horticulture and dairy sector in Kenya have all been attributed to public support and favourable regulations. A 2005 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) report on food-security in Africa mentioned in particular the positive effects of: “…
- the role of the legal and policy framework (land reform, regulatory frameworks, contractual arrangements);
- institutional support through initially public-funded authorities that provide services to producers, and sometimes are used for channelling subsidies (inputs), but which are gradually transferred to producer associations or the private sector; and
- Public infrastructure (for transport of product and export abroad).”
Concentrating on food availability in a country like Kenya does neither identify the real causes of chronic hunger nor of famine. Increasing Kenya’s agricultural productivity alone will, therefore, not solve the problem. Instead, an examination of the social relationships that identifies different groups of people with command and ‘entitlements’ over food is more effective and points at the heart of the matter. It has been said that the top 10 percent households control over 42 percent of the country’s total income, while the bottom 10 percent control less than 1 percent. For every shilling a poor Kenyan earns, a rich Kenyan earns 56 shillings.
Land is often regarded as an important resource in Kenya and can be the origin of inequality and violent disputes. The type of land being held and the way it is being held is important. With over 80% of the population dependent on agriculture, access to arable land is a clear dimension of inequality. While a few landowners own huge tracks of idle land, landless farmers are squatting in fragile forests. Whereas the arid and semi-arid areas remain inappropriately administered, policed or abandoned entirely in spite of their potential viability, public land, eyed as profitable, was allocated illegally or irregularly to the well-connected and often developed subsequently with public funds as well. As a matter of priority, we urge a sustained and firm commitment to develop the marginalized areas of Kenya, in terms of access to water, security and public infrastructure.
A key element in the prevention of famine is the protection and creation of livelihoods, which can in principle be achieved through public action. Public action could reduce chronic hunger through providing jobs, health care, education, access to water and elements of social security. This, obviously, raises questions about a government’s development policies in general, and its actual political will to implement those. We would like to see massive support for the small farmer through improved land tenure security, extension services, irrigation schemes, and access to credit.
Kenya was to develop its Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS) since 2002, this has been a challenge to date. We welcome the spirit of openness on the part of the Government, indispensable in creating a collaborative environment in which decisions are to be taken. We see, however, two significant weaknesses in this system: (1) underdeveloped co-ordinating structures at national level, in particular limited government involvement in the existing structures and poor linkages between information and response planning/policy options; and (2) poor linkages within and between levels e.g. from community to district to provincial and national levels. We see the lack of coordination and integration within and between the various structures and institutions as probably the most important constraint in the fight against famine and chronic hunger. We are particularly weary of new and ad hoc departments within government which have been created over the years when ever there is famine and only complicate the prevailing disorientation.
We also question the ways of channelling public aid to those who are most in need. We fear that the lack of accountability and transparency, which has tainted the Kenyan administration for decades, is reflected in this matter as well. The intention of a government when it declares a “national disaster” can be a noble one. The ensuing influx of funds, however, also creates new temptations for those who know to turn the system to their personal advantage. The situation is further complicated by reported poor handling of the Strategic Grain Reserve, of market interventions and decision on imports. Several sources suggest that big producers and traders are holding on to their stocks in order to create an artificial shortage of maize on the market and keep prices at a high level at the same time they are exporting maize to neighbouring countries. We see relief food marked ‘not for sale’ ending up in the shops. To misallocate funds destined for the poor, even through neglect, is a grave sin in the Bible (Luke 16, 19-31).
Public action to prevent famine is most likely to be taken when vulnerable people have been empowered by political movements which establish a governmental obligation to prevent mass starvation. In this regard, we disapprove the tendency, to remove all affirmative action in favour of minorities and marginalized groups.
Your reactions and comments are welcomed
Wednesday, February 18, 2009
YOWERI MUSEVENI-PRESIDENT;JANET MUSEVENI-MINISTER
I will want to take the comments from Godfrey Onentho seriuosly.In his comparison of the variuos Uganda leaders,he singled out Idd Amini and Museveni as the most daring dictators of sorts.But unlike Idd Amin Dada,the "conquarer of the British empire" as he called himself,Museveni is avery cleaver dictator.He has perfected the art of having two faces.One face is that of a democrat and a reformist.This is the face that the donors and other friends of Uganda see,and it has earned him a good name with many of them.He has received lots of praises and support from the international community.The other face ,probably the one that faces Uganda is of a dictator,who do not respect the constitution and the rule of law.
His wits are growing by the day,and from my presumption,Museveni is seeing the bigger picture of his schemes when many other people are still taking his actions as unculculated.Why am I saying this.
After rescuing Uganda from the ravage of civil wars in 1986,23 years down the line he still considers himself the Messiah for Uganda.I heard some person saying he is still paying himself for the trouble and pain he went through to bring Uganda to what it is now.That is the reason why at one forum,he had the audacity of asking people where they were when he was in he bush fighting.Were you not busy sleeping with your families in your houses?.He will ask.And Janet Museveni,his wife will tell the people,less they forget that God sent Museveni to save Uganda...And the saviour should carry on.
You might differ with me,but I read red,when I see Museveni`s governemnt enact very punitive and restrictive laws for the NGOs.NGOs has been the voice of the people and a close partner of development of the people.I read red,when he is clammping down on the media,and now the picture is becoming more clearer,when he appoints his wife Janet, a first time MP for Ruhaama County as a minister for the Karamoja region and his brother Salim Saleh as his defence advisor.Promoting his friends to various cabinet and junior cabinet positions and sidelining those not supportive of him.
Is it an advance form of manipulation before the 2011 election?.Does he want to leave office anytime soon?By the way recently he bought the most expensive presidential jet in Africa when Uganda bearly have an airline of its own.He has also build a very luxurious state house in Entebbe and with the discovery of oil and romour of minerals in Karamoja.Is he ready to leave all this to another person? I dont know.
If he is truely streamlining governace and fighting corruption,why sack the finance minister and retain his friend and loyalist Amema Mbabazi;yet all of them were involved in the same land scandal at Temagala?
Is this a wider scheme for remaining in governance beyond 2011 or is it a normal act of governance?
His wits are growing by the day,and from my presumption,Museveni is seeing the bigger picture of his schemes when many other people are still taking his actions as unculculated.Why am I saying this.
After rescuing Uganda from the ravage of civil wars in 1986,23 years down the line he still considers himself the Messiah for Uganda.I heard some person saying he is still paying himself for the trouble and pain he went through to bring Uganda to what it is now.That is the reason why at one forum,he had the audacity of asking people where they were when he was in he bush fighting.Were you not busy sleeping with your families in your houses?.He will ask.And Janet Museveni,his wife will tell the people,less they forget that God sent Museveni to save Uganda...And the saviour should carry on.
You might differ with me,but I read red,when I see Museveni`s governemnt enact very punitive and restrictive laws for the NGOs.NGOs has been the voice of the people and a close partner of development of the people.I read red,when he is clammping down on the media,and now the picture is becoming more clearer,when he appoints his wife Janet, a first time MP for Ruhaama County as a minister for the Karamoja region and his brother Salim Saleh as his defence advisor.Promoting his friends to various cabinet and junior cabinet positions and sidelining those not supportive of him.
Is it an advance form of manipulation before the 2011 election?.Does he want to leave office anytime soon?By the way recently he bought the most expensive presidential jet in Africa when Uganda bearly have an airline of its own.He has also build a very luxurious state house in Entebbe and with the discovery of oil and romour of minerals in Karamoja.Is he ready to leave all this to another person? I dont know.
If he is truely streamlining governace and fighting corruption,why sack the finance minister and retain his friend and loyalist Amema Mbabazi;yet all of them were involved in the same land scandal at Temagala?
Is this a wider scheme for remaining in governance beyond 2011 or is it a normal act of governance?
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